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A Sentencing Problem: How Far Is a Fall
From Grace?
H. H. A. Cooper*
T IS NOW ALMOST UNIVERSALLY ACCEPTED that there are three
possible bases underlying sentences imposed by the Courts,
following some breach of the criminal law. These are generally
described as retribution, deterrence and reformation. Occasion-
ally these qualities are considered in combination under some
such title as the "aims of penal measures." 1 Another factor, ever
present in a vague though influential form, now seems to be
emerging from the shadows to assume more definite shape. Yet
to materialize is its relationship to the other established, uncon-
troverted aims. The emergent element may conveniently be
termed "public disapproval," under which may be subsumed all
those social sentiments, tacit or express, which reflect in the view
taken of the offender's conduct. It is increasingly evident that
imprecision in regard to the understanding of this factor and its
relationship to the accepted sentencing criteria constitutes a
great obstacle to the rationalization of penal policy and is at the
root of many of the inconsistencies into which Courts are forced
from time to time. A recent English criminal appeal 2 serves to
highlight these problems.
In England, crimes of considerable gravity, or those in which
the trial is considered to present some feature of complexity, are
generally reserved for trial by the Assize Courts. Trials are held
within the territorial circuits into which the country is divided
for jurisdictional purposes, the Court comprising a single High
Court Judge, or Commissioner of Assize, with equivalent powers,
and a jury. Appeals lie from this Court, on questions of law or
fact or mixed questions involving both, to the Court of Criminal
Appeal in London.3 Some appeals require leave of the trial
Court, or the Appeal Court itself, if such leave is refused, while
* Visiting Prof. of Law, La Universidad Nacional Mayor de San Marcos(Lima, Peru) Facultad de Derecho; M.A., Liverpool; LL.B. (Hons.) London.
1 For example, Dr. Nigel Walker, Crime and Punishment in Britain, Edin-
burgh University Press, 126 et seq. (1965).
2 Regina v. McConnach, The Times Law Report, 21st March 1966.
3 Court of Criminal Appeal Act, 1907, as modified by the Court of Criminal
Appeal Act, 1964.
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others are of right. A convicted person may appeal either against
conviction or sentence and much of the Court's work lies in hear-
ing appeals of this latter category. Although a further appeal on
a point of law lies, theoretically, to the House of Lords, such ap-
peals in practice are rare. The importance of the judgments of
the Court of Criminal Appeal, which is composed of three or
more High Court judges, will be readily seen. It is true to say
that the views of this tribunal, more than any other, must be
taken to represent those principles of sentencing policy which
are presently valid and followed throughout the English penal
system.
The application for leave to appeal in the case of Regina v.
McConnach3a was heard by two High Court judges together with
the Lord Chief Justice, who by reason of his position enjoys ad-
ditional administrative responsibility for ensuring the uniformity
of sentencing, 4 the latter delivering the judgment of the Court.
These facts while relating nothing unusual in the disposal of
criminal appeals nevertheless indicate the high standing of the
judgment and its orthodoxy. William Alexander McConnach,
formerly Chief Constable of Southend on Sea, had applied for
leave to appeal against concurrent sentences of two years im-
prisonment imposed after he had been found guilty on eight
counts of causing money to be delivered by false pretences; eight
corresponding counts of fraudulently applying money; and one
count of causing a valuable security to be delivered by false pre-
tences. The appellant had been convicted at the Central Crim-
inal Court (The Old Bailey), which serves as Assize Court for
London and the Home Counties, after a trial lasting 28 days, an
unusually lengthy period by modern English standards. The
original notice of appeal had been against conviction, but this
aspect was not pursued, the proceeding before the court being
only on the issue of sentence. The question, then, was whether
there existed grounds on which sentence might have been re-
duced. It is in the Court's examination of this possibility, in
reaching the conclusion that the appeal was groundless, that the
penalogical interest lies.
The facts of the case are of some importance to a consider-
ation of the penalogical issues involved. The appellant had been
3a Supra, note 2.
4 Periodic conferences on sentencing practices have been inaugurated by




Chief Officer of Police in an important residential resort in South
Eastern England. The English police are organized almost exclu-
sively on a local basis, the Chief Constable being responsible to
the police authority, which in this instance was the Watch Com-
mittee of the County Borough of Southend. 5 Subject to the ap-
proval of the Home Secretary, a minister of the central govern-
ment, it is the police authority which appoints the Chief Con-
stable and this authority in addition has considerable, continu-
ing, administrative powers in relation to the force under his
command. McConnach was appointed to his position in 1953 and
held office until 1964. It is perhaps of importance to state that
appointments to Chief Constable are non-political and appointees
are generally career policemen, who have attained considerable
distinction and successive promotion within the police service.
McConnach had entered the police service in 1931 and had just
such a record of attainment. It was, at his trial, an accepted fact
that he improved the morale of the police force under his com-
mand "out of all recognition" so that it became in the opinion of
many, "the finest police force in the country." A few words from
the Lord Chief Justice are not inappropriate at this point:
"There was no doubt that he showed there exceptional gifts of
organization and leadership . . . He also improved the relation-
ship between the police and the public. He inspired all those who
served under him, and commanded their loyalty and devotion."
This, then, was the man who on 22nd November 1965 found him-
self convicted of dishonesty.
The events leading to this tragic end to a distinguished ca-
reer were that the Chief Constable had at his disposal a fund of
£200 administered by the finance officer of the Southend Watch
Committee. Among payments to be made from that fund were
reimbursements to members of the criminal investigation depart-
ment in respect of payments to informants, or, for hospitality to
them or for other legitimate police purposes. Detailed application
of this fund was under the exclusive and secret control of the
Chief Constable, who alone maintained an explanatory record of
payments. Between 1954 and 1964 expenditures from the fund
rose from £470 to £1500 a year, and this no doubt caused en-
quiries to be made as to the manner of its application. It is un-
necessary here to consider in detail the results of the investiga-
5 On the organization of the English police generally see J. M. Hart, The
British Police (Allen & Unwin, 1951).
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tion that followed or how far the conduct of the Chief Constable,
at this stage, may have led to his downfall. It suffices to state
that it was shown that a substantial part of the increase was
attributable to the expenditures of the Chief Constable himself,
who had utilized monies to disburse hospitality and promote po-
lice purposes. The trial turned primarily upon the legitimacy of
these practices; in the words of the Appeal Court, "the real issue
before the jury was whether what was done was done in the hon-
est belief that he could use that money. The jury, by their ver-
dict, had clearly said 'No'." Conviction had obviously to follow
such a conclusion, and as the validity of this was not disputed
on appeal, the matter can be put to one side so far as it relates
to that. The facts outlined have, however, their own materiality
as concerns the sentence.
The practical importance of the appeal to the applicant is
clearly exposed by his counsel, whose argument ran, "He would
have been entitled at 60 years of age, (he was then 56 years of
age) to retire on a pension of £2,300 a year, which would have
survived to his wife if she had lived longer than he. The com-
muted value of that pension was something in excess of £25,000
-which was a monetary penalty heavier than any court could
dream of imposing. Unless some exceptional factor intervened,
that pension would be lost to him-there was power to withdraw
even a granted pension if the pensioner was sentenced to impris-
onment for more than 12 months." 6 This clearly constitutes an
important fact in any evaluation of the consequences of the sen-
tence imposed upon the appellant; it accordingly received due
consideration in the judgment of the Court. One further matter
is important, for evaluative purposes, before proceeding to con-
sider what may have motivated the Court's decision. In the open-
ing words of the judgment, "The offences of which the applicant
was convicted represented 17 out of a total of 85 alleged cases of
fraudulent dealing with public funds carried on by him over a
period of 21 months between April 1963 and January 1965. The
amount involved in the 85 cases was said to be between £1,100
and £1,200 and in the 17 counts some £160." It seems of con-
siderable relevance, therefore, that whatever may have been
suspected, the penalty imposed can only be weighed against
proven defalcations in the sum of £160.
6 An interesting case in which the pension right was also an issue was





The Court considered that the appellant's counsel had put
forward three points to which it was said the trial judge had
given insufficient weight in sentencing the appellant to two years
imprisonment. The first referred to the appellant's own belief
as to the rectitude of his conduct. As the argument was para-
phrased by the Court, "While it could be said that this money,
broadly speaking, was expended in lavish and unreasonable hos-
pitality, it was done under the self-induced delusion, one might
call it, that good will promoted by such hospitality would ad-
vance the efficiency of the police force." The second was the ex-
ceptional character hitherto enjoyed by the appellant, while the
third is of such importance that it deserves to be couched in the
language chosen by the Court: "Thirdly, that no deterrent sen-
tence was necessary in this case, since it was unlikely in the high-
est degree that any Chief Constable would be tempted to do the
like-nor, from the applicant's own point of view, was a sentence
designed to reform in any way necessary." The Court itself add-
ed, "There could be others said in his favour: perhaps, in par-
ticular, it could not be said that he had in any way corrupted, if
that was the proper word, any member of the force of which he
was a member." The Court considered all these points, but con-
cluded it "was quite clear a sentence of imprisonment was called
for." Two other portions of the judgment must be cited in full
in order that the Court's view may be clearly displayed.
"In the opinion of this Court, anyone in the applicant's po-
sition as head of a local police force and having authority over
the expenditure of public funds, inevitably held a position of
high trust and a correspondingly high duty." "Further, a public
servant, whether he was a postman or a police constable on the
beat, who committed an offence of dishonesty in the course of his
employment-still more if it involved public funds under his
control-was almost invariably sent to prison. How then, one
asked oneself, could anything less be imposed if that person was
a Chief Constable of a local police force? And, if a sentence of
imprisonment was called for, again one asked oneself, how could
it be said that a sentence of two years was in any way exces-
sive?" As the Court can be taken to have said nothing else re-
vealing as to its motivation in the matter of sentence, it is the
final passage that is perhaps the most important in the whole
judgment.
The Court thus decided a sentence of two years imprison-
ment was appropriate in this case; from the point of view of
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theoretical penology it is of the utmost importance to decide why
it did so. The answer to this is far from clear because, it is re-
spectfully submitted, the Court itself was far from clear on the
real issue. Reverting to the classic bases for punishment of a
criminal act, it is interesting to fit the Court's assumptions, tacit
or otherwise, to the factors of deterrence and reformation. It
seems that deterrence, particular or general, can be ruled out as
having influenced the Court. Even were McConnach ever again
elevated to a position of like responsibility, in itself a most im-
probable event, the eventuality of his being deterred by this ex-
perience rather than by the promptings of his otherwise innate
good character (as evinced by his record) is one which scarcely
warrants serious consideration. England is indeed fortunate in
the administration of her police services, and corruption in high
places is rare; the language of the Court in considering the deter-
rent quality of the sentence as it might affect others in similar
position to McConnach is, therefore, in no way exaggerated. More
relevantly, perhaps, can it be said, either as a scientific or a
commonsense matter, that this sentence has any reformative
quality about it?
The shame of this distinguished former police officer is no
doubt considerable at the plight in which he finds himself. It
seems unlikely, on the evidence alone of the grounds on which
the appeal was prosecuted, that as a result of the sentence there
has been any fundamental change in what the Lord Chief Justice
described as "the self-induced delusion." If there has, then, been
no reform of view, what is the measure of this sentencing aim
in more conventional terms? The best description of the reform-
ative aim of the prison sentence is to be found in the words of
the Gladstone Committee on Prisons, 1895: "Prison treatment
should be effectually designed to maintain, stimulate, or awaken
the higher susceptibilities of prisoners and turn them out of
prison better men and women, both physically and morally, than
when they came in." 7 This article of faith, as it has been de-
scribed, has received present day affirmation.8 Is this process
necessary or desirable in the present case, by reference to the
known character and personality of the offender? Is it not rather
like putting a brand new shirt in a washing machine full of dirty
clothes in the hope that it might thereby come out improved?





We are left with the alternative basis of retribution, or some-
thing else.
Enlightened criminologists and others have thundered heart-
ily against simple retribution, that is, action against the offender
which has no other object than inflicting upon him some degree
of damage or suffering on account of his offence. The battle has
raged most fiercely in the field of capital punishment, where,
whether or not the retributive element may be considered excep-
tionally high, the other two elements must certainly be consid-
ered on a lower plain. The official view before the Royal Com-
mission on Capital Punishment 1949-1953, was expressed thus:
"There is no longer in our regard of the criminal law any recog-
nition of such primitive conception as . . . retribution... There
is a school of thought in this country which would still regard
vengeance and vindication of the law as a feature of our system.
It is not a principle which animates any proposal which comes
from the Home Office." 9 Expressing the Christian view, Dr. Tem-
ple, then Archbishop of Canterbury, pointed out that "all punish-
ment should contain the remedial or reformative element, for, as
has been said, this element is at its minimum in the death penal-
ty." 10 The United States Supreme Court has said: "Retribution
is no longer the dominant purpose of the criminal law: reforma-
tion and rehabilitation of offenders have become important goals
of criminal jurisprudence," 11 and it has been urged in conse-
quence "that retribution can no longer be morally justified in a
modern Judaeo-Christian society, and that therefore this may be
ignored as a basis for sentencing." 12 The weight of evidence
justifies this conclusion. If deterrence and reform did not moti-
vate the McConnach sentence, was it retribution that did so?
The Court itself did not specifically tell us.
The judgment, practically, did two things. It justified the
sentence of imprisonment and approved its duration as appro-
priate. The justification is essentially very simple: dishonest
public servants are always sent to prison. The very charm of
this justification lies in its simplicity, so the Court, wisely, did
not spoil matters by indicating why this should be so. Interesting
9 Royal Commission Evidence, Day 1, page 39, cited "Capital Punishment as
a Deterrent and the Alternative." Gerald Gardiner (now Lord Gardiner,
Lord Chancellor) Gollancz (1956) p. 83.
10 Id. at page 35.
11 Williams v. New York, 337 U. S. 241, 69 S. Ct. 1079, 1084 (1949).
12 See Charles W. Webster, Jury Sentencing-Grab-bag Justice, 14 South
Western Law Journal 229 (1960).
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though the criminological argument thus opened up might have
been, the omission could hardly have been accounted a fault in
relation to the Court's immediate purpose. The Court did not
consider it proper to pronounce upon what was essentially a
piece of social jurisprudence, which is what this primary question
really is, that is to say, "Why do we invariably send errant public
servants to prison?" The Court contented itself with the obser-
vation of the undoubted fact. But the second part of the prob-
lem, that is to say, "for how long," was made to depend in this
case directly upon the first. The Court, although it posed itself
a most attractive question in the concluding passage cited, did
not provide the answer at all. The Court's judgment comes very
near to being a flat assertion of correctness and is far from being
a model of the reasoned sentence called for, amongst others, by
Professor Cross.'3 It is suggested that the justification factor, in
whatever it may consist, cannot provide a standard of measure-
ment for the sentence itself; it can only provide a theoretical
basis for awarding some kind of punishment. It is of importance,
for further clarification, to see exactly what this justification
factor really was.
Is this factor really retribution, perhaps in another guise?
A modern writer has recently posed the interesting view that:
"The lex talionis dies hard. If the price of an eye is not precisely
an eye, there are still many to whom justice requires a fair
equivalent. No one, it is true, would express it so crudely today.
It would be put on a loftier level. Civilized society, it would be
said, can only survive if it can maintain discipline. No discipline
can be maintained if breaches are tolerated. Society is therefore
obliged, in the interests of self-preservation, to vindicate its
authority by the ruthless suppression of indiscipline." 14 Later
the same author posits that, "Metaphors apart, there are certain
classes of offence, the social implications of which do mark out
a broad and barely flexible line, beyond which considerations for
the personal problems of the offender must give way to the pro-
test of the public against what he has done." 15 In his evidence
to the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, Lord Denning,
the present Master of the Rolls and a most progressive minded
Is See Dr. Rupert Cross, Paradoxes in Prison Sentences (inaugural lecture,
Vinerian Chair, Oxford), 81 Law Quarterly Rev. 212-215 (1965).
14 See Walter Raeburn, The Bespoke Sentence, 5 British J. of Criminology
266-267 (1965).




judge 6 wrote: "Punishment is the way in which society ex-
presses its denunciation of wrong doing and in order to maintain
respect for law it is essential that the punishment inflicted for
grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the
great majority of citizens for them." "I Yet another writer has
put it: "Society punishes the offender in order to make certain
that the act may be considered abhorrent to the minds of men.
This preserves the moral ideal, for without punishment no man
would know whether an act were 'good or bad'." 18 It seems in-
escapable that as motivation in the present case there was either
retribution, by whatever other attractive name it might choose
to be known, or that this principle of "social defence," 19 "social
security" or "social disapprobation"" enjoys a separate existence
and must be added to the traditional three aims upon which pun-
ishment is said to be based. Whatever part it may play in justi-
fying some sort of punishment, it is submitted, however, that it
has a very different role to play in the selection and measure-
ment of that punishment itself. Until this is firmly appreciated
in theory and practice there will exist the danger of punishment
being meted out according to wholly inappropriate criteria.
It has been sagely observed, "In spite of its common accept-
ance, the view that the vindication of law and order and the de-
terrence of a repetition of the offence are both constituent ele-
ments of punishment is not an accurate one. They are in fact
simply occasions for punishment on objective grounds of policy.
But punishment itself is subjective. It is visited upon an indi-
vidual in respect of his personal offence." 21 Sentencing should
be a purposeful activity. One can show disgust, revulsion, dis-
approval in a variety of ways, both positive and negative. The
exercise is, however, very restricted in purpose, if all it serves
to do is to exhibit these feelings. A sentence that does nothing
more than mark out society's "disapproval of the breaking of its
16 Hilary, The Importance of Denning, The Lawyer, Vol. 7, No. 1, pp. 15-19
(1964).
17 Cited in Crime and Punishment in Britain, op. cit. supra, note 1, at p. 140.
18 Walter A. Lunden, The Theory of Crime Prevention, 2 British J. of
Criminology 217 (1961-62).
19 The term is not used here in the rather special sense generally reserved
for it; see "Crime and Punishment in Britain," op. cit. supra, note 1.
20 The Law Society, the professional body of the solicitors' branch of the
legal profession, in a memorandum to the current Royal Commission on the
penal system, refers to this as the 'D' factor and considers it an appropriate
factor for a court to take into consideration in imposing sentence.
21 The Bespoke Sentence, op. cit. supra, note 14, at p. 216.
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laws" 22 can give very little return for the effort expended. Does
the sentence on McConnach really do any more than indicate
the assumed extent of society's disapproval of errant policemen?
By no conceivable criterion can it be said to do so. The harm
done to the offender is enormous and no element in the sentence
he has received can mitigate this. Has not, however, society
harmed itself by this show of disapproval rather more than is
compensated by any foreseeable advantage? Who can rejoice in
this fall from grace, whose inward conformist state is fortified
by it? 23 Is it enough to say, "But we always send errant police-
men to prison and two years is hardly too long?"
Whatever may have been the opportunities for the commis-
sion of these particular crimes, they do not technically constitute
offences which are the special prerogative of Chief Officers of
Police or the like. There is no special category of "white collar
crime" here, though many of the particular problems inherent in
that much-controverted topic have an interesting bearing upon
the present case.24 Unquestionably an ordinary first offender
who had committed a crime like this, having similar testimony as
to character as that advanced and accepted on behalf of McCon-
nach, would not have incurred higher liability than supervision
under a Probation Order. The Court has, in effect, created a
special class of offenders, public officials and the like, who must
suffer greater penalties if they transgress. This is a distinct move
away from individualization, but so long as the judge has the re-
sponsibility for sentencing by reference to an open-ended scale
this type of judicial legislation is likely to persist. The real ques-
tions here are: "Did the offender necessarily have to go to pris-
on?" and if so, "Did he necessarily have to go for two years?"
The Court's affirmative was based, it is suggested, upon a mis-
taken view of what was demanded by "social disapproval." It has
been rightly said of the objectives of sentencing that: "First, is
the overriding necessity of a sentence which, taken together with
the judgment of the conviction itself, adequately expresses the
community's view of the gravity of the defendant's misconduct.
Second, is the necessity of a sentence which will be as favour-
able as possible, consistently with the first objective, to the de-
22 Paradoxes in Prison Sentences, op. cit. supra, note 13, at p. 216.
23 See Dr. Jackson Toby, Is Punishment Necessary?, 55 J. of Criminology,
Crim. Law and Police Science, 334-335 (1964).
24 See Dr. Donald J. Newman, White Collar Crime, 23 Law and Contemp.




fendant's rehabilitation as a responsible and functioning member
of his community." 25 It goes on to stress that, ". . . The commu-
nity is interested in the defendant's realization of his potential-
ities as a human being and the contributions he can make to the
community life." 26 The onus of showing that the community's
interests have been better served in the present case by a de-
structive act of imprisonment, rather than some other mark of
disapproval, is a heavy one indeed. There is nothing in the judg-
ment to show that the Court felt in any way oppressed by its
burden, and this must sadden many who have consistently hoped
for a more enlightened attitude. The prevalence of the more
retributive attitude which lingers should not be underestimated.
It has been observed, "Most modern writers discussing the policy
goals of criminal law, tend to deny the current importance of
retribution. It is summarily dismissed as being no longer an
appropriate goal for the law, and ipso facto, it no longer exists.
A cursory examination of a few criminal trial records makes it
all too clear, however, that, even if not widely acknowledged, it
is still a potent factor in the process of criminal adjudication.
Those judges whose public statements leave little doubt of their
retributive intentions towards certain types of offenders are by
no means exceptional in relation to ultimate results." 27
It is suggested that the sending of errant public servants to
prison is not a self-evident necessity, although their conviction
is. Social disapproval has relevance in determining the aims of
the criminal law, not the sentencing policies of the judges or
whatever agency might in the future be entrusted with the task.
Where it is adopted as a sentencing factor it is no more than thin-
ly veiled retribution and as such should be limited as far as prac-
ticable and eliminated if possible. The aim which should replace
it is "social interest," which comprehends the interest of the com-
munity as a whole and that of the individual transgressor as a
member of it. The Judges' duty is to strike a balance, by refer-
ence to the facts of each case, between the various detailed, com-
peting requirements of society in general and those of the offend-
er. Society gains no benefit from empty retributive gestures and
may well, as would seem likely in the present case, be the loser
thereby.
25 See Dr. Henry M. Hart, Jr., The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 Law and
Contemp. Problems 437 (1958).
26 Ibid.
27 Dr. Andrew S. Watson, Critique of the Legal Approach to Crime and
Correction, 23 Law and Contemp. Problems, 615 (1958).
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